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ABSTRACT
The Influence of Family and Community Ties 
on the Demand for Home Equity Conversion Mortgages
by
Kenneth Allen Knapp 
Adviser: Professor Michael Grossman
Reverse mortgages are loans against home equity that do not have to be repaid 
until the borrower moves, sells the home, or dies. The loans generally are available only 
to older homeowners, usually aged 62 or over. This paper explores whether demand for 
reverse mortgages is influenced by the strength o f area’s family and community ties. 
One type o f reverse mortgage is analyzed: the FHA-insured Home Equity Conversion 
Mortgage (HECM). Several researchers have estimated the potential demand for reverse 
mortgages. To my knowledge, this is the first study of how actual demand may be 
determined, and o f how it may be related to potential demand.
The unit o f  analysis is a county in one o f  26 selected metropolitan areas in the 
United States. The primary measures o f the strength o f a county’s family and community 
ties are those relating to the out-migration of young and old residents. Other variables 
used to measure family ties include the degree o f  religious adherence in the county and 
the percent o f its residents that were bom in that state. Race and educational achievement 
are also used in the analysis. Differences in the market development o f HECMs across 
counties are accounted for by including measures o f HECM counselors and lenders that 
are active in each area. Data from a variety of sources are used. The data are analyzed 
by method o f ordinary least squares and two-stage least squares regressions.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
VFairly strong evidence that family and community ties do influence demand for 
HECMs is found. A higher incidence o f  young out-migration, reflecting weak family and 
community ties of the young, tends to increase demand for reverse mortgages. The 
opposite is found for old out-migration, which implies that when the old are not attached 
to their communities, they will be less interested in reverse mortgages. The percent of 
persons bom in the same state as their current residence is found to negatively influence 
demand.
Racial composition, educational achievement, and the extent o f market 
development in an area also are found to influence demand for reverse mortgages.
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1I. INTRODUCTION
Reverse mortgages are loans against honue equity that do not have to be repaid 
until the borrower moves, sells the home, or di es. The loans generally are available 
only to older homeowners, usually aged 62 orr over. This paper explores whether 
demand for reverse mortgages is influenced boy the strength of area’s family and 
community ties. Several previous studies obtained estimates o f the potential demand 
for reverse mortgages. To my knowledge, this i s  the first study of how actual demand 
may be determined, and o f how it may be related! to potential demand.
The life-cycle model o f consumption theorizes that after a certain age, 
households begin to draw down wealth—including home equity—in order to smooth 
consumption over time. Homeowners with a bequest motive, however, may be less 
inclined to do this because they would like to leave an inheritance. In areas o f weak 
family ties, the bequest motive should be relatively weak. Homeowners in these 
areas will be less concerned about preserving w ealth  for future generations, and more 
likely to draw down wealth in line with the life-cycle hypothesis—unless, that is, the 
homeowners do not want to stay in the commurMity. In areas where their ties to the 
community are relatively weak, older homeowners will be less likely to exhibit 
interest in reverse mortgages. Thus, both the strength o f an area’s family ties and the 
degree to which its older residents are attached to the community are analyzed for 
their effect on demand for reverse mortgages.
Reverse mortgages are one way for homeowners in the United States to draw 
down home equity. In contrast to a conventtional forward mortgage, monthly 
repayments are not required on a reverse nnortgage. Interest on the cash
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
2disbursements1 to the borrower continues to accrue over the life o f the loan and to be 
added to the outstanding debt.2 The loan becomes due and payable (in full) only 
when the borrower ceases to use the home as the primary residence, sells it, or dies.3
The home equity and not the creditworthiness o f the borrower secures a 
reverse mortgage; therefore, the borrower’s ability to repay the debt is not an issue. 
Nearly all reverse mortgages are restricted to older borrowers, usually aged 62 and 
over.
The vast majority o f older persons would like to remain in their current homes 
for as long as possible. The AARP found that 92 percent o f persons aged 65-74, and 
95 percent o f  those 75 and over, express a desire to age in place.4 With a reverse 
mortgage, house-rich, income-poor older homeowners can realize their wish.
1.1. Fa m il y t ie s , the  b e q u e st  m o tiv e , a n d  th e  d e m a n d  f o r  reverse  m o r t g a g e s
The perspective o f this paper is that both the life-cycle and the bequest motive 
theories operate in differing degrees in every household: some homeowners reduce 
home equity as they age, and others will leave their homes to heirs. In areas where
1 Usually, the borrower may select from several disbursement options: lump sum, line-of-credit, and 
monthly payments for life or for a specified number o f years.
“ As noted by Scholen (1996), forward mortgages may be characterized as “falling debt, rising equity,” 
whereas reverse mortgages may be characterized as the opposite, “rising debt, falling equity.”
3 The loan may also be terminated if the borrower fails to maintain minimum property standards or to 
pay property taxes and homeowner’s insurance.
AARP (2000a), p.24-25. The percents refer to those respondents who strongly or somewhat agreed 
with the statement: “What I’d really like to do is stay in my current residence for as long as possible.”
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
3family ties are strong,5 evidence o f a bequest motive should be relatively prominent, 
and demand for reverse mortgages should be relatively low.
The further a child lives from a parent, the weaker may be the 
intergenerational family ties and any bequest motive on the part of the parent. In the 
aggregate, parents with children living afar are probably less likely than those with 
children nearby to be concerned about leaving their homes as a bequest to their 
children. Data on the geographic proximity o f children to their parents would 
improve any study of the relationship between a bequest motive and the consumption 
o f housing by older individuals. Unfortunately, such data are not available.
O f course, a child need not live near a parent to inherit the parent’s wealth, 
including housing wealth. Nevertheless, parents who own homes may be interested 
not in transferring wealth per se, but in transferring the physical property. This desire 
would be stronger among parents with children living in the same vicinity than 
among those with children living further away. Parents who feel relatively certain 
that their children would actually live in the homes they bequeath to them have a 
motive to bequeath their homes that other parents do not. Both types o f parents— 
those who think that their children would inhabit the inherited home and those who 
do not—may or may not possess a bequest motive insofar as financial wealth is 
concerned. The parent with a child nearby, though, is more likely to bequeath the 
home because there is a greater chance that the child would inhabit the home.
5 As discussed in Chapter 1.2, this study also analyzes community ties. The family and community ties 
o f the old and young may influence demand for reverse mortgages differently, and so their separate 
influences must be evaluated.
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4Parents derive utility from bequeathing their homes to their children. The 
probability that a parent will bequeath the home increases with the utility a child 
receives from the bequest. The child’s utility depends positively not just on the dollar 
value of the home, which can be sold and converted to financial wealth, but also on 
the value he or she attributes to living in the inherited home (“consuming” the home).
Both the child living near and the one living afar derive utility from inheriting 
the financial wealth represented by the home, but the former derives more of this 
“wealth utility” because disposing o f the house would involve greater time and 
money costs for the child living afar. The child who lives near also derives more 
utility from consuming the home because he or she is likelier than the child afar to 
dwell in it.6 The more distant the child, the larger the disruption caused by the 
relocation—the sacrifice of proximity to a job, o f a preferred community 
environment, etc.—and this lowers the utility derived from moving into the parent’s 
home. Thus, total utility is expected to be higher for the child living near the parent. 
On average, then, parents with children living nearby are likelier than other parents to 
bequeath their homes, and hence less likely to be interested in reverse mortgages.
Rasmussen, Megbolugbe, and Morgan (1995) point out that reverse mortgages 
may be ideal instruments for accommodating inter vivos wealth transfers. That is, the 
transfer of wealth from older homeowners to their children or grandchildren need not 
occur only after the homeowner’s death. Thus, the authors claim, the desire to leave a
6 Even if  the child does not intend to live in the parent’s house, the option to do so would exist. The 
value o f this option is greater for the nearby child than for the one living afar.
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5bequest probably will not decrease—and may even increase—demand for reverse 
mortgages.
HUD does not systematically collect data on the uses o f HECM proceeds,7 so 
it is not known how many of the loans are used for inter vivos transfers. Anecdotal 
evidence suggests that the number o f HECMs taken out for this purpose is very 
small.8 To the extent that HECMs are used to transfer wealth during the lifetimes o f 
borrowers, the hypothesis that the existence o f  a bequest motive will decrease the 
demand for HECMs is weakened. However, the argument made above regarding the 
desire o f  older homeowners to transfer physical property continues to be relevant: 
however much reverse mortgages may be used to accomplish inter vivos transfers o f 
financial wealth, they cannot be used to transfer physical property—that is, the home 
itself. In an area where family ties are strong, the desire to transfer the physical home 
is relatively strong, and so demand for reverse mortgages— for whatever purpose—is 
relatively low.
Since many borrowers apparently first leam about HECMs through their 
children or other family members, it might be argued that older homeowners with
7 Ken Scholen, founder o f  the National Center for Home Equity Conversion (NCHEC), and perhaps 
the most widely respected authority on reverse mortgages in the U.S., calls the lack of data on the uses 
of HECM proceeds “the single most disappointing thing about the program.” [Personal 
communication.]
8 Ken Scholen o f  NCHEC has encountered a few borrowers who have used reverse mortgages “to 
make bequests while they’re still alive so they can enjoy the process.” [Personal communication.] 
Scholen’s guess is that the majority o f HECMs are used to pay off existing mortgages (thereby 
increasing monthly income), to make home repairs or improvements, or to prepare for unexpected 
financial emergencies. Analyzing borrower feedback from participants in a focus group, HUD (2000, 
p.83) finds that “the goal o f most participants [for taking out the HECM] was to remain independent 
and to enjoy the same quality of life to which they had been accustomed.” (Only 34 borrowers 
participated in the focus group, so this claim must be regarded as tentative.)
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6children are more likely than those without them to take out a reverse mortgage.9 A 
similar argument is that those with children may take out a reverse mortgage to avoid 
being a burden on their children, another reason demand for reverse mortgages might 
be positively related to whether or not an older homeowner has children.10 These 
arguments are flawed.
Would the borrower with children really be more likely than the other 
homeowner to take out a HECM? In order to answer this question properly, 
everything else about the two prospective borrowers must be held equal—age, home 
equity, home value, need for additional monthly income, the strength o f their areas’ 
family ties, and so on. The only possible differences between the two would be that 
the one with children: (1) has a bequest motive; (2) may be more likely to have heard 
about HECMs because of a wider informational network; (3) may not want to be a 
burden to the children; and (4) may be able to rely on the children for financial and 
other support. In order for one to conclude that the parent with children would indeed 
be more likely than the other to take out a HECM, points (2) and (3) would have to 
weigh more than points (1) and (4). There is no reason to expect that this would be 
the case.
9 Venessa White, vice president o f BNY Mortgage Co., said in a personal communication that often, 
“children are the ones who push for reverse mortgages.” HUD’s (2000) focus-group analysis finds that 
while some children bring HECMs to their parent’s attention, others regret their parent’s decisions to 
take out these loans.
10 As Rasmussen, Megbolugbe, and Morgan (1995) suggest
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71.2. O ut-m ig r a t io n  m a t r ix
Data on individual households showing the proximity o f the householder’s 
children, strength o f  intergenerational ties o f the household, and whether or not the 
householder has taken out a HECM are not available. Instead, I analyze data on 
family and community ties and HECM activity o f different counties in the U.S., each 
of which is a component o f one o f 26 selected metropolitan areas. The primary 
measures of these ties relate to the out-migration of old and young residents. Out­
migration is defined as a move from the county to a location beyond the metropolitan 
area.11
Taken together, a high (low) incidence o f out-migration of the young and the 
old indicates a general weakness (strength) o f the area’s family and community ties. 
Each category o f out-migration (old and young) must be analyzed separately, though, 
because they influence demand for reverse mortgages in different ways.
High out-migration o f  young persons means that their ties to the community 
and to family members remaining there are weak. Relative to areas where young out­
migration is low, high young out-migration is expected to increase demand for 
reverse mortgages because old homeowners in the community will be less 
constrained by a bequest motive. Low out-migration of the young has the opposite 
effect on demand.
High old out-migration indicates that the ties of old persons to the community 
and to family members there are weak; however, the effect upon demand for reverse 
mortgages is different than in the case of high young out-migration. As with the
11 The definition o f a metropolitan area as a cluster o f counties is discussed further in Chapter IV.
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8young, weak family ties among the old are expected to increase demand. In contrast 
to the young, though, the effect of the weakness o f the old’s community ties is to 
decrease demand. The reason is simple: old residents who plan to move will not be 
interested in reverse mortgages, which are acquired only by persons who want to 
remain in their homes. This would be true even if  the old’s family ties were weak. 
Regarding the demand for reverse mortgages, the weakness o f the old’s community 
ties, as reflected in a high incidence of out-migration, dominates the weakness of their 
family ties.
The interpretation o f a low incidence of old out-migration is somewhat more 
problematic. On the one hand, low old out-migration suggests that the old are 
strongly attached to their community; thus, demand for reverse mortgages might be 
relatively high. On the other hand, low out-migration implies that the old’s ties to 
family members in the area are strong, which would increase the power of a bequest 
motive for holding home equity, and therefore would decrease demand for reverse 
mortgages. By simultaneously accounting for the degree o f young out-migration, 
these conflicting implications o f how a low incidence o f  old out-migration might 
influence demand are resolved, as the following discussion shows.
Figure 1 is a matrix identifying four counties: A, B, C and D. Consistent with 
the definition o f out-migration used in this study, the matrix refers to movers from a 
given county to a location beyond that county’s metropolitan area. A boldfaced, all 
capitals “YOUNG” means that out-migration o f young persons is low, and a 
lowercase “young” means that young out-migration is high. Similar meanings apply 
to “OLD” and “old.”
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9
County A (OLD, YOUNG) is characterized by low out-migration o f both 
young and old. The low young out-migration has a negative influence on demand for 
reverse mortgages. The effect o f the low old out-migration, though, is ambiguous.
Demand for reverse mortgages in County A, however, is clearly lower than in 
County B (OLD, young). There is low old out-migration in County B, just as in 
County A. In County B, however, there is high out-migration o f  the young. As a 
result, the bequest motive is less prevalent in County B than in County A. Even 
though the old in Counties A and B are equally attached to their communities (and to 
family members still there), those in County A are more constrained by a bequest 
motive, and therefore less likely to be interested in reverse mortgages. Thus, demand 
for reverse mortgages is higher in County B than in County A.
Demand is also higher in County B than in County C, which is most easily 
seen by observing that demand in County A is higher than in County C. Both 
counties (A and C) have low young out-migration, but County C (old, YOUNG) has 
a high incidence o f old out-migration. The old homeowners in County C, then, are 
less likely than those in County A to desire reverse mortgages because they are more 
likely to want to move. Since, as already shown, demand is higher in County B than 
in County A, the fact that demand is higher in A than in C implies that it is higher in 
B than in C.
Demand is also higher in County B than in D (old, young). Both counties 
exhibit a high degree o f young out-migration. The difference is that in County D, 
there is also a high incidence o f old out-migration. Relative to D, old homeowners in 
B want to remain in their communities, despite the fact that young out-migration is
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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high. As a result, homeowners in B will be more interested in reverse mortgages than 
those in D.
The goal of this study is to test whether or not it is true that demand for 
reverse mortgages is higher in counties similar to B than in other counties. This 
requires that the incidence o f old and young out-migration both be included in the 
analysis.
Two other indicators o f the strength o f a county’s family ties are included in 
this study: the percent o f  residents who belong to a religious denomination, and the 
percent who were bom in the county’s state. These are discussed in more detail in 
Chapter IV, as are other variables not relating specifically to family or community 
ties, but which may influence demand for reverse mortgages. These include race, 
education, and the degree to which the reverse mortgage market is developed in the 
county—as suggested by the per capita12 number o f active reverse mortgage lenders 
and counselors.13
Before discussing these data and the method o f analysis, a brief description of 
the main types of reverse mortgages available in the United States is given, followed 
by a closer look at the one analyzed in this study—the Department o f  Housing and 
Urban Development’s (HUD’s) Home Equity Conversion Mortgage (HECM).
12 As discussed in Chapter IV, these measures are adjusted for the number o f  homeowners that are 
potential buyers o f reverse mortgages in an area (referred to as “potential demand”). The term “per 
capita” here refers to these adjustments.
13 As explained below, borrowers o f the type o f reverse mortgage analyzed here are required to obtain 
third-party (non-lender) counseling.
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n. TYPES OF REVERSE MORTGAGES
There are three major types o f  private reverse mortgages [Table 1]: (1) the 
HECM, initiated in 1989 by HUD and insured by the Federal Housing Administration 
(FHA); (2) the Home Keeper reverse mortgage, designed and backed by the Federal 
National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae), initiated in 1995; and (3) Financial 
Freedom Senior Funding Corporation’s (FFSFC’s) Cash Account Plan, a proprietary, 
non-federally insured loan available in a limited number of states. The presently 
limited geographic availability makes it unsuitable for the purposes o f this study
The HECM’s share o f the private reverse mortgage market—80 to 90 
percent— far exceeds that o f the other two.14 As with the Home Keeper and FFSFC’s 
Cash Account, the minimum eligible age for a HECM borrower is 62. HUD data on 
the number of HECMs sold by county, lender, and year are analyzed in this study.15
The borrower may use the proceeds o f a private reverse mortgage for any 
purpose. Public sector reverse mortgages, in contrast, are single-purpose loans. 
There are two types o f public sector loans [Table 1]: deferred payment loans (DPLs) 
and property tax deferrals (PTDs). Both are restricted to low- or moderate-income 
households. DPLs are available from local government agencies and may only be 
used to pay for home repair or improvements. State- and local-govemment- 
sponsored PTDs must be used to offset property taxes. Public sector reverse
14 According to Roger Reynolds [personal communication], vice chairman o f Wells Fargo Home 
Mortgage, Inc. and member of the National Reverse Mortgage Lenders Association’s board of 
directors, HECMs represent about 90 percent o f  all reverse mortgages originated by private lenders in 
the United States. Tom Scabareti [personal communication], vice president o f marketing at FFSFC, 
estimates the HECM’s market share at 80 to 85 percent, Home Keeper’s share at five percent, and 
FFSFC’s Cash Account Plan at 10 to 15 percent.
15 Fannie Mae does not make data on its Home Keeper available to the public. [Quercia (1997), p.202, 
fii.2.]
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mortgages are more numerous than private reverse mortgages, but their dollar 
amounts are almost always much lower.16
Reverse mortgages have several factors in common. The loan is due and 
payable in full only when the borrower moves, sells the home, or dies.17 Compound 
interest accrues on the outstanding balance. The maximum loan for which a borrower 
is eligible depends on the value o f the home, the interest rate charged on the loan, and 
the expected term o f the loan, which is based on the borrower’s life expectancy.18
16Scholen (1996), Ch. 18.
17 At one time, at least one proprietary lender offered a type of reverse mortgage that did not have to 
be repaid if the borrower moved—this was Household Senior Services’ “Household Plan.” Some 
reverse mortgages are fixed-term loans, which became due and payable after a specified number of 
years.
18 The calculation o f the maximum loan amount is based on the borrower’s age-based life expectancy 
(the expected term). The longer the life expectancy, the lower the loan amount. Depending on how 
long the borrower actually lives and remains in the home, the actual term o f the loan will be different 
from the expected term. Only the age o f the borrower is used to determine the expected remaining 
years of life. Other factors such as health status, race, and sex are not considered.
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in . THE HOME EQUITY CONVERSION MORTGAGE19
The first HECM was closed in October 1989,20 two years after Congress 
mandated that the HECM Insurance Demonstration be initiated. Many federal and 
quasi-federal agencies, advocacy groups, financial institutions, and other interested 
parties were involved in the design o f the HECM program. Besides an interoffice 
working group created by HUD, these included Fannie Mae, the Federal Home Loan 
Mortgage Corporation, the AARP, the National Center for Home Equity Conversion 
(NCHEC), the American Bar Association’s Commission on Legal Problems o f the 
Elderly, state housing finance agencies, the U.S. Department o f Health and Human 
Service’s Administration on Aging, lenders, private mortgage insurers, housing 
counselors, area agencies on aging, and other public interest groups.21
Consumer advocacy groups— especially the NCHEC and AARP—were the 
driving forces behind the initiation o f  the HECM program. Industry representatives, 
HUD, and other federal agencies “had to be dragged, kicking and screaming” into
!9This chapter has relied on several sources. HUD (1990), (1992), (1995), (2000); Scholen (1998); 
and AARP (2000b) all provide fairly detailed, sometimes overlapping information on the general 
features o f  the HECM program including borrower eligibility, mandatory counseling, eligible 
properties, and the calculation of payments to borrowers. Since federal and state laws and HUD 
regulations relating to HECMs are ever changing, the older publications are in some ways obsolete, 
although they sometimes contain details that the others do not.
A wealth o f  information on HECMs and other types o f reverse mortgages is also available 
from several websites, including those maintained by AARP (Tittp://www.aara.org/revmort/). the 
National Center for Home Equity Conversion ('http://reverse.org/'). and the National Reverse Mortgage 
Lender’s Association ('http://www.reversemortgage.org/links.htm).
20HUD (1992), p.1-7.
21 HUD (1990).
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accepting the idea o f a federal reverse mortgage program, and the advocacy groups 
did the dragging.22
For years leading up to Congressional inquiries into a federally supported 
program, “massive efforts” by consumer advocates and others to generate interest 
among private insurers failed.23 Insurers o f  reverse mortgages are exposed to a 
variety o f risks. From a lender’s perspective, there is tenure risk (the uncertain length 
o f residency by the borrower), appreciation risk (the uncertain property appreciation 
rates), and loan balance risk (the uncertainty o f  the future amount o f  the loan 
balance).24 The borrower faces the risk that the lender will not make promised loan 
disbursements (default risk)25 Evaluating the combination o f these risks and deriving 
appropriate pricing mechanisms proved too large an obstacle to private insurers.26 
Without a federally supported reverse mortgage insurance program, it is unlikely that 
the market would have developed very extensively.
The FHA-insured HECM program was created partly as a “laboratory” in 
which the special risks associated with reverse mortgages could be evaluated.27
22 Ken Scholen [personal communication]. That consumer advocacy groups were strongly in favor o f  
establishing some type o f federal reverse mortgage program is evident from their testimonies before 
Congress [for example, U.S. Congress, House, (1984) and U.S. Congress, Joint Briefing (1985)].
23 Ken Scholen [personal communication].
24 Loan balance risk stems both from uncertain future interest rates and uncertain cash disbursements to 
the borrower (for example, it is not known when a borrower o f a line-of-credit HECM will withdraw 
fimds, or how much the withdrawals will be).
25 U.S. Congress, Joint Briefing (1985), testimony by Maurice D. Weinrobe, Department of 
Economics, Clark University.
26 Ken Scholen [personal communication]. According to Scholen, who was heavily involved in 
discussions with private insurers, the insurers were uncomfortable with the “radical” nature o f reverse 
mortgages. “Property [insurers] knew about appreciation risk, but not about mortality risk [the 
uncertainty associated with the borrower’s life expectancy],” he said, “and [insurers who knew about] 
mortality weren’t sure about tenure or property risk.”
27 Ken Scholen [personal communication].
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Besides attracting private insurers, it was hoped also that the federal program would
increase the involvement o f private originators, servicers, and investors.”28
Fifty FHA-approved lenders, each permitted to sell 50 HECMs, were selected
by lottery at the initiation o f  the program. Originally, HUD was authorized to insure
2,500 HECMs through September 1991. A 1990 change in the law expanded the
program: the number o f authorized HECMs was increased to 25,000 through 1995
and all FHA-approved lenders were allowed to participate.29 In 1998, the program
became permanent, and allowable outstanding loans were increased to 150,000.3° By
the end of year 2000, FHA had insured a total o f 44,418 HECMs.31
The HECM program is specifically intended:
to meet the special needs o f elderly homeowners by reducing 
the effect o f the economic hardship caused by the increasing 
costs o f meeting health, housing, and subsistence needs at a 
time of reduced income . . .  ,32
To be eligible for a HECM, the prospective borrower must be age 62 or 
over.33 HUD may, at its discretion, set a higher age.34 Had HUD prescribed a higher 
age to account for the fact that HECMs should appeal most to older homeowners (as 
discussed below), it is possible that lenders could have marketed the HECM more
28 HUD (2000), p.32.
29HUD (1992), p. 1-2.
30HUD (2000).
31 Based on data obtained from HUD.
32 U.S. Code, Title 12, §17I5z-20(a).
33 When a couple takes out a reverse mortgage, the youngest borrower must be age 62 or over. There 
are no restrictions on the number o f signatories with a HECM: “Three sisters or four friends would be 
as eligible as a single individual or a couple, assuming that they are all 62 year[s] o f age or older and 
are all owners o f the residence . . . but, in each case, [the amount o f the loan] would be based on the 
age of the youngest borrower.” [HUD (1990), p.4-3],
34 U.S. Code, Tide 12, §1715z-20(b).
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efficiently.35 By selecting age 62, however, more prospective borrowers leam about 
HECMs. Even i f  the younger homeowners leam that the proceeds they can get from 
a HECM are currently too low to be worthwhile, they may decide, based on the 
information they gathered during their initial inquiries, that the loan might be useful 
later, or that it might benefit someone else they know.36
Eligible properties include owner-occupied 1- to 4-family homes, 
manufactured homes built after June 1976, condominiums, and dwellings that are part 
o f Planned Unit Developments. The law was amended in December 2000 to extend 
eligibility to cooperative housing units.37
Among the costs bom e by the HECM borrower [Table 2] is mortgage 
insurance, the premiums of which are collected by the FHA. The insurance not only 
protects the borrower from the risk o f lender default, but also protects the lender from 
the “crossover” risk that the loan balance will exceed the value o f  the home when the
■ jo
loan becomes due and payable. All types o f reverse mortgages provide that the 
amount owed cannot exceed the value of the home at the time the loan becomes 
payable. The value o f the home might be less than the loan balance if  the borrower 
lives in the home for longer than expected, if  interest rates rise unexpectedly over the 
life o f the loan, or if  the home appreciates too slowly.39 Other costs that must be paid
35 Persons at younger ages often discover after visiting and spending time with lenders (and with 
counselors) that the amount o f the loan for which they qualify is too low to warrant taking out a 
HECM. [Ken Scholen (personal communication).] In such cases, the time spent by the lender 
educating the prospective borrower goes unrewarded.
36 Ken Scholen [personal communication]. All the thoughts in this paragraph are his.
37 National Reverse Mortgage Lenders Association website http://reversemortgage.org (accessed 
February 20, 2001).
38Discussions of crossover risk and its relationship to insurance risk and borrower payments may be 
found in Szymanoski (1990) and Chinloy and Megbolugbe (1994).
39 HUD (2000).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
17
by the borrower include origination fees, closing costs, servicing fees,40 and interest. 
These costs may be paid for with the proceeds o f the loan—that is, the borrower is 
not required to have the cash necessary to pay for these costs up front.
HUD requires that the interest rate charged on adjustable-rate HECMs must 
be equal to the one-year, constant maturity Treasury security index plus a lender’s 
margin.41 Currently, Fannie Mae is the secondary market buyer of virtually all 
HECMs.42 Fannie Mae determines the lender’s margin that must be applied to 
HECMs that it will purchase;43 thus, all mortgagees charge the same interest on newly 
originated HECMs. Mortgagees could, if they wished, charge a higher lender’s 
margin than that set by Fannie Mae, but then Fannie Mae would not invest in their 
HECMs. Although, theoretically, mortgagees could charge a lower margin and still 
sell their HECMs to Fannie Mae, this is very unlikely to occur in practice. The 
profitability o f HECMs is already low—below that o f conventional forward 
mortgages—and market activity is modest. Charging lower interest than the Fannie 
Mae standard would almost certainly result in lower profits because it is unlikely that 
loan volume would increase enough— if it increased at all— to offset the reduced 
revenue generated by each HECM originated.44
To date, only a few small lenders—originating altogether a “trivial number of 
loans”—have chosen to retain their HECM assets rather than sell them to Fannie
40 Servicing HECMs includes maintaining data on monthly loan activity, providing borrowers with 
periodic loan statements, certifying occupancy and property maintenance, changing borrower payment 
plans, accepting mortgage repayments, declaring the mortgage due and payable, and many other tasks. 
[Fannie Mae (2000)].
41 HUD (1994).
42 HUD (2000), pp.50-51.
43 Fannie Mae (2000).
44 Venessa White, vice president of BNY Mortgage Co. [personal communication].
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Mae.45 (Whether the lender’s margins on their loans differ from those o f other 
HECM originators is not known.) Capital constraints may reduce the willingness o f 
lenders to hold HECMs or other types o f  reverse mortgages in their portfolios 46 
Unlike forward mortgages, where monthly cash inflows from the borrower begin 
approximately one month after the debt is originated, cash inflows from reverse 
mortgages—one-time, lump-sum repayments—usually occur only after several years.
In March 2001, the Fannie Mae lender’s margins were 1.20 percentage points 
for monthly adjustable loans and 2.10 points for annually adjusted loans.47 Very few 
fixed-rate HECMs, which are also permitted by HUD, have been originated because 
Fannie Mae will not purchase them.
The borrower may elect to receive the HECM loan: as a single lump-sum, as a 
line-of-credit (that grows over time), as a monthly cash advance for a fixed period 
(“term” loan), as a monthly cash advance for as long as the borrower lives in the 
home (“tenure” loan), or as any combination o f lump sum, credit line, or monthly 
cash advance. The borrower has the right to change the method of loan disbursement 
at any time.
As with all reverse mortgages, the maximum loan allowable with a HECM 
depends positively on the age o f the borrower and the value of the home, and 
negatively on the interest rate applied to the loan.48 With the interest rate, home 
value, and other factors—such as race, sex, and household income—given, the appeal
45 HUD (2000), p.50, fh.29.
46 Tom Atwell, senior business manager for senior products at the Single-Family Marketing division of 
Fannie Mae [personal communication].
47 Adjustments are linked to changes in the one-year Treasury index.
48 For a detailed analysis o f how HECM payments are determined, see Szymanoski (1990).
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o f a reverse mortgage should increase with the age o f the homeowner, as older 
borrowers will receive larger cash outlays.49 The age-based life expectancy of the 
borrower is used to estimate the life o f the loan when it is originated. Cash outlays to 
older borrowers are expected to be o f shorter duration, and so can be larger in dollar 
amount to achieve any given loan balance.
Female general population mortality tables are used for all borrowers to 
determine loan payments under the HECM program.50 Federal law prohibiting 
discrimination against loan applicants on the basis of sex means that gender-specific 
mortality tables cannot be used to determine HECM payments.51 (The same law 
covers discrimination by race). In designing the HECM, HUD chose to use the 
female mortality tables instead o f blended tables—which would have been allowable 
under the law—partly because “a large majority o f borrowers [were] expected to be 
female.”52
Given their lower age-based life expectancies [Table 3], males essentially get 
a worse deal from HECMs than do females. For example, with a tenure loan, males 
will receive the same payments as females, but for fewer years (on average). Insofar 
as the HECM design should be more appealing to females than to males, HUD’s 
expectation that a high percent o f borrowers would be females is at least partly self- 
fulfilling. As Table 4 shows, females living alone represent a much higher percent of
49 HUD (Mar. 1995).
50 HUD (1990) With multiple signatories, payments are based on the age o f the youngest borrower.
51 U.S. Code, Title 15, §1691(a).
52 HUD (1990), p.5-2.
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HECM borrowers (56.3% in 1999) than they do o f all older homeowners (29.6% in 
1997).53
As whites have higher life expectancies than blacks54 [Table 3], the HECM is 
basically a better bargain for them. Thus, it might be expected that whites would 
represent a higher percent o f HECM borrowers than they do o f all older homeowners, 
and that the opposite would be true o f blacks. This was generally true earlier in the 
HECM program [Table 4], but not later. Whites made up 92.7 percent of HECM 
borrowers in 1995 (compared to 87.2% of all homeowners), but only 86.4 percent in 
1999. Meanwhile, the percent of HECM borrowers who are black rose from 5.9 to 
9.2 (7.8% o f all older homeowners are black).
It is possible that more effective marketing o f the HECM product to minorities 
than to whites may explain the shift in racial composition. Lenders receive an 
implicit reward for marketing HECMs to minorities. Fannie Mae, which invests in 
virtually all HECMs sold, must meet minimum income-based and geographically 
targeted housing goals when purchasing mortgages. One of the geographically 
targeted goals relates to “properties located in census tracts within metropolitan areas 
where . . . minorities comprise 30 percent or more o f the residents and the median 
income o f families does not exceed 120 percent o f the area median income.”55 
HECMs that are sold to borrowers in such areas may be easier to re-sell to Fannie 
Mae—if not now, when market activity is fairly low and when the ability to re-sell is
53 In Table 4, the figures on all homeowners are for 1997 (except for income (1995)), whereas the 
figures for HECM borrowers are for 1995 and 1999. Using the 1997 figures instead o f the 1995 and 
1999 figures for all homeowners [available in U.S. Census Bureau (1997) and (2001)] facilitates the 
comparison to HECM borrowers without affecting the conclusions reached in the text.
54 The data refer to non-Hispanic white and black persons. Hispanics may be o f any race.
55 HUD (1996), p.23.
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not a real concern, then perhaps when market activity expands. Lenders subject to 
Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) requirements may also target minorities, since 
HECMs qualify for CRA credit.56
Besides race and ethnicity, Table 4 compares other characteristics o f HECM 
borrowers to all other older homeowners. As expected, the average HECM borrower 
tends to be older than the average o f  all older homeowners. (The gap is wider than 
suggested in Table 4, since the total group o f older homeowners is aged 65 and over, 
compared to 62 and over for the HECM group.).
Table 4 also shows that the median income o f HECM borrowers is below that 
o f other older homeowners; however, HUD (2000) warns that the data underlying this 
figure are not reliable.57 It is possible that lower income homeowners are in greater 
need o f converting their home equity into cash in order to meet daily living expenses, 
medical bills, etc.
HUD (Mar. 1995) reported that HECM borrowers had an average o f 0.59 
children, but the data underlying this statistic were later determined to be unreliable.58 
It is reasonable to assume that the average number o f children among HECM 
borrowers is lower than the average among non-borrower since older homeowners 
with children are likelier than those without to avoid reverse mortgages (because of a 
higher bequest motive).59
56 HUD (Mar. 1995), p.3-5.
57 A later tabulation o f the data revealed many cases where values were zero or missing.
58 As with the income data, a later analysis revealed a high percent o f missing or zero values. The zero 
values for number o f children could indicate either that the value is indeed zero or that the respondent 
did not supply the information.
59 In other words, HECM borrowers are likelier to have no children, which lowers the average number.
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The median appraised property value tends to be greater among HECM 
borrowers ($107,000 for all loans closed 1989-1999) than among all older 
homeowners ($87,000 in 1997).60 The percent o f HECMs taken out by residents of 
central cities (41.3%) is much higher than the percent o f  all older homeowners that 
live there (24.1%). In contrast, the percent o f HECM borrowers who reside in non­
metropolitan areas (11.8%) is lower than the corresponding percent o f all older 
homeowners (18.7%).61
60 HUD (2000).
61 HUD (2000).
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IV. DATA AND METHOD OF ANALYSIS 
IV. 1. M e t h o d  o f  a n a lysis
The method o f ordinary least squares (OLS) is used test whethier the strength 
of an area’s family ties influences the demand for HECMs. To address the possible 
endogeneity o f one o f  the regressors (LENDERS), a two-stage least squares (TSLS) 
regression is also performed.
The unit o f analysis is a county in one o f 26 selected metropolitan areas in the 
United States (Table 5). Counties are included within a metropolitan ar-ea by the U.S. 
Office o f Management and Budget (OMB) when there are strong social and economic 
linkages between the counties and a populous core area.62 This study follows the 
1990 metropolitan area definitions.
Appendix A describes o f all the variables and their expected sigzns. Summary 
statistics o f the variables are provided in Table 6.63
IV. 2. D e p e n d e n t  variable
The dependent variable, HECM9000, is the number o f FHA-endorsed HECMs 
purchased over a ten-year period (1990-2000) by borrowers residing un the county,
62The OMB analyzes the level of commuting to jobs between a county and a central c ity  to determine 
whether to include that county in a metropolitan area. Counties are convenient bui3ding blocks of  
metropolitan areas both because county boundaries do not change and because o f thee prevalence of 
countywide data. [McDonald, 1997, pp.4-5. See U.S. Census Bureau (1998), App»endix II, for a 
detailed discussion o f the OMB standards.]
63 Data sources are listed just prior to the list o f references at the end of the paper.
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divided by potential demand for reverse mortgages in the county, times 1,000.64 In 
other words, HECM9000 is the number o f HECMs purchased per 1,000 units of 
potential demand over a ten-year period.
IV. 3. P o te n tial  d e m a n d  f o r  reverse  m o r t g a g e s
Several studies conducted in the past decade attempted to estimate the 
potential demand for reverse mortgages. To my knowledge, this study is the first to 
attempt to explain actual demand for reverse mortgages, and to relate actual demand 
to potential demand.
Researchers have estimated the number (or proportion) o f households with 
characteristics they considered representative of potential interest in reverse 
mortgages. In general, potentially interested homeowners are those that are very old, 
have high housing equity, and receive low incomes. The underlying idea is that 
households that can increase their cash flows substantially through a reverse 
mortgage will have relatively high interest in these loans.
Varying estimates have been derived based on different assumptions about 
which income level, housing valuation, and age of householder should be used to 
indicate potential demand. Merrill, Finkel, and Kutty (1994) use the 1989 American 
Housing Survey to estimate a “lower bound” o f potential demand in the U.S. equal to
64 According to both Ken Scholen o f the NCHEC and Venessa White o f BNY Mortgage Co., all but a 
trivial number of lenders charged the same interest rates on HECMs throughout this period. Earlier in 
the HECM program, when a few investors besides Fannie Mae were active in the secondary market for 
HECMs, some lenders— very few o f them—may have sold HECMs at interest rates different from 
those required by Fannie Mae. For the past several years, Fannie Mae has been the only active 
investor in HECMs. Thus, there is no need to correct for interest rate differences across lenders when 
analyzing demand.
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800,000 households. This was the number o f householders in 1989 aged 70 and over 
who had lived in their homes for more than 10 years, with annual income of 530,000 
or less, and with home equity between 5100,000 and 5200,000.65
Defining potential demand as equal to the number o f  homeowners aged 62 
and over who could increase their monthly income by 20% or more with a reverse 
mortgage, Mayer and Simons (1994) estimate potential demand at six million 
households (1990). The authors’ estimates are based on an analysis o f the Census 
Bureau’s 1990 Survey o f Income and Program Participation.
Kutty (1998) uses data from the 1991 American Housing Survey, and finds 
that 621,000 homeowners aged 65 and over could have been raised above the poverty 
level in 1991 i f  they would have obtained a reverse mortgage. This represented 29 
percent o f all poor householders aged 65 and over in that year.
Rasmussen, Megbolugbe, and Morgan (1995) use the U.S. Census Public Use 
Microdata Sample (5%) to derive an estimate o f 6.7 million homeowners aged 70 and 
over with 530,000 or more in home equity (in 1989). These homeowners compose 
what the authors call the “primary market” for reverse mortgages. The authors’ 
estimates suggest that an additional 4.4 million homeowners aged 62-69 would have 
entered the primary market group by 1998, bringing total potential demand in the 
United States to 11 million.
In addition to estimating potential demand for the entire U.S., Rasmussen, 
Megbolugbe, and Morgan (1995) also estimate potential demand for selected
65 Householders with equity above 5200,000 were excluded because the authors thought they “are 
more likely to have other assets and may not want a reverse mortgage.” [op. cit., pp.279-280].
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metropolitan areas. A weighted average o f their metropolitan area estimates was used 
to derive this study’s county-level figures. The weights are based on the percent o f a 
metropolitan area’s homeowners aged 75 and over that reside in each county (1990 
data).66
Rasmussen, Megbolugbe, and Morgan argue that reverse mortgages should be 
viewed as tools not only for smoothing consumption over time, as predicted by the 
Iife-cycle hypothesis, but also as “asset management tools.” In their view, the ability 
to alter the composition o f wealth—from illiquid to liquid assets— is an attractive
feature o f reverse mortgages for prospective borrowers at all income levels. Hence,
»
unlike other researchers, they do not consider income in their estimate o f potential 
demand. Restricting an estimation of potential demand to homeowners whose loan 
proceeds would represent a “large” percent of their monthly incomes entails making 
an arbitrary choice o f what loan-to-income figure to use as a threshold. This 
restriction ignores the asset-management feature of reverse mortgages.
Insofar as it is calculated without being truncated at some arbitrary income 
threshold, Rasmussen, Megbolugbe, and Morgan’s estimate represents an upper 
bound of potential demand for reverse mortgages. In my study, estimation o f actual 
demand is adjusted for this upper-bound measure o f potential demand.67
66 Data on homeowners aged 70 and over were not available, so those aged 75 and over were used. To 
the extent that the distribution across metropolitan areas is different for homeowners aged 75 and over 
than it is for those aged 70 and over, the weights are flawed. My analysis o f 1,850 counties, including 
the 129 observations in this study, reveals that it is unlikely that the distributions are different 
systematically. Two sums were calculated using 1990 Census population data: one o f persons aged 
70-74 across the 1,850 counties, and one o f those aged 75-79. The percents o f these totals represented 
by each county were then determined. The correlation between the two percents is 0.998.
6 As mentioned, analysis in this paper is at the county level, and Rasmussen, Megbolugbe, and 
Morgan’s estimates for selected metropolitan are used to derive potential demand for each county.
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IV. 4. In d e p e n d e n t  v ariables  i n  OLS
As discussed in Chapter I, the principal measures o f  the strength o f a county’s 
family and community ties that are used in this study are two relating to out­
migration—out-migration o f  the young (Y_OUT'), and out-migration o f the old 
(OLDJDUT'). These variables refer to the percent o f residents o f  a certain age that 
moved from a county to a location beyond that county’s metropolitan area during the 
1985-1990 period.
OLD OUT is the percent o f all residents aged 60-79 in 1985 who out- 
migrated by 1990. In 1990, the beginning of the 1990-2000 period over which 
HECM loan activity is analyzed in this study, this cohort would have been aged 65- 
84. HUD (2000) reports that about three-fourths o f HECMs purchased through the 
year 1999 were by persons in this age group. The midpoint o f  this age group is 
approximately equal to the median age of all HECM borrowers (75).
The percent o f residents out-migrating in one period is probably serially 
correlated with the percent in previous periods. For example, if  the 1985-1990 
percent was high, then among the pool o f older homeowners living in the county in 
1990, a high percent o f them probably plan to move. (Out-migration data analyzed 
here are from 1985-1990; data on HECM loan activity are from 1990-2000.) If they 
plan to move, then they will not desire a HECM. Thus, the expected sign of this 
coefficient is negative.68
68 Chapter 1.2 provides a detailed discussion o f  how OLD_OUT and YJDUT are expected to influence 
demand.
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Y_OUT is the percent o f persons aged 25-39 in 1985 who moved out o f the 
metropolitan area by 1990. Those younger than 25 were not selected in order to 
avoid individuals o f primary college age, who may move temporarily to attend 
college before returning home. The expected sign of Y_OUT is positive because a 
high percent reflects weak family ties among the young and a weak attachment to the 
community, reducing any bequest motive among the old homeowners in the area.
Other variables used to measure the strength o f  a county’s family ties are 
RELIGION  and BO RNJN.
RELIGION  is the percent o f residents who belong to a religious denomination. 
By including this variable, the aphorism “The family that prays together, stays 
together,” is taken seriously. When RELIGION  is high, intergenerational bonds are 
thought to be relatively strong. The expected sign o f RELIGION is negative.
BORN_IN  is the percent o f the county’s population who were bom in the 
same state as their current residence. When B O R N JN  is high-, this increases the
likelihood that multiple generations o f the same family live in the county. As a 
consequence, demand for reverse mortgages is expected to be relatively low. 
B O R N JN  is expected to be negative.
Two other independent variables are included in the regressions: WHITE and 
ED. These variables do not relate specifically to family ties, but may influence
demand for HECMs for other reasons.
WHITE is the percent o f the population who are white. As discussed in 
Chapter m , whites have higher average life expectancies than do non-whites, so the 
HECM is basically a better deal for them. As a result, it is possible that demand
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among whites will be greater than among non-whites, so the expected sign o f  WHITE 
is positive.
Whites as a group could have stronger or weaker family ties than non-whites. 
I f  family ties among whites are generally weaker, then WHITE would still be 
expected to have a positive impact upon demand for HECMs. However, if  ties 
among whites are stronger, then WHITE could be negative.
ED is the percent o f residents aged 25 and over who have graduated from 
college. The expected sign o f ED is positive because it is assumed that persons with 
higher educational status are more sophisticated (on average) when it comes to 
financial investments, and better able to judge the costs and benefits o f  financial 
instruments, especially those as complex as reverse mortgages.69
It is well known that educational achievement and income are highly, 
positively correlated. (For the 129 counties in this study, the simple correlation 
between ED and the counties’ median income (INCOME) equals 0.5909 (Table 7).) 
Thus, in the regressions reported here, the coefficient on ED picks up some of the 
effect o f INCOME. As discussed below, INCOME is used as an instrument for 
LENDERS, which is possibly endogenous.
Previously, it was mentioned that the demand for HECMs possibly might be 
negatively related to income. Theoretically, excluding INCOME from the regressions 
may create biased estimators; however, an analysis o f regressions that were run with 
and without INCOME reveals that neither the coefficients nor the statistical
69 When ED is high, the percent o f older persons (that is, those eligible for HECMs) that are highly 
educated is assumed to be high also. A similar assumption is made regarding WHITE.
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significance of the remaining regressors are substantially altered.70 For this reason, 
but especially because INCOME is considered a fairly good instrument for 
LENDERS, the variable is excluded from the regressions (except as an instrument).
Two measures of the degree to which the HECM market is developed— 
LENDERS and COUNSMSA—are included among the explanatory variables. These 
variables are included to account for variation across observations in the availability 
o f HECMs, the intensity with which they are marketed, and the ease with which 
prospective borrowers may obtain correct information about them.
The first measure o f market development relates to HECM counseling. To 
ensure that they “understand the full impact of tapping into home equity,”71 
prospective borrowers are required by law to obtain counseling from a HUD- 
approved housing counseling agency before they can take out a HECM. A party 
other than the lender must provide the counseling. To prevent conflicts o f  interest, it 
is unlawful for counselors to charge a fee for referring a prospective borrower to a 
lender.72
Advocates for the elderly, lenders, and others involved in developing the 
HECM program generally agree that counseling is warranted both because o f “the 
newness and complexity” o f the loans, and because of “[t]he vulnerability o f many
10 Nor is the overall explanatory power o f the regressions much affected by excluding INCOME. In 
fact, the adjusted R-square tends to increase slightly without INCOME. In the regressions where 
INCOME is included, it is not statistically significant.
71 HUD (Mar. 1995), p.4-1.
72 HUD (2000). Conflicts o f interest may exist nevertheless. A majority o f counseling agencies 
interviewed by HUD reported that lenders refer all or most o f the prospective HECM borrowers that 
walk through their doors. Some borrowers interviewed did not realize that they had even received 
counseling, but had thought they were dealing with representatives o f the lender.
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elderly households.”73 Some prospective borrowers resent the mandatory counseling 
as paternalistic.74 Others who had counseling and then decided to take out a HECM 
complained later that “they were not aware o f the full costs o f [the] loans and would 
not have chosen a HECM if  they had been better informed o f other options.”75 
Although these complaints suggest that the quality o f counseling is not always up to 
par (as discussed below, this is well known), they also suggest that mandatory 
counseling—when adequate—may not be a bad idea.
The counseling session is intended help the prospective borrower make an 
informed decision about the suitability o f a HECM for his or her financial needs and 
situation. In the session, the counselor must discuss (a) the availability to the 
homeowner o f  other housing options (such as selling the home and moving into a 
rented apartment),76 social services, and financial resources; (b) other reverse
73 HUD (1992), p.4-1.
74 HUD (1992).
75 HUD (2000), p.78. As discussed below, HECM counselors are required to discuss the financial 
implications o f  HECMs with the prospective borrower. Counselors and the prospective borrowers 
both must sign a “Counselor Certificate” certifying that the financial implications and other specific 
matters (reviewed below) were discussed in detail. Thus, prospective borrowers that are unhappy with 
the quality o f the information provided by counselors have only themselves to blame if  they chose to 
sign the certificate nevertheless.
Federal Truth-in-Lending law requires that EECM lenders disclose to borrowers the Total 
Annual Loan Cost (TALC) o f the loans. This is the annual rate that, when applied to the cash 
advances received by the borrower, would generate the outstanding debt at a specified future date. 
(The total debt includes not only the cash advances and accrued interest, but also origination fees, 
closing costs, servicing fees, and insurance premiums [which all accrue interest] financed by the loan.) 
The TALC is considered the best indicator o f a HECM’s cost, and allows borrowers to compare costs 
across different types o f  reverse mortgages. [Scholen (1996); HUD (2000), pp.92-94. TALC 
requirements are discussed in detail on the NCHEC website, www.reverse.org/info.update.tila.html]
That some EECM borrowers complain about not understanding the “full costs” o f the loans is 
not necessarily a reflection o f inadequate counseling, since it is the lender’s responsibility to disclose 
the TALC. Since there are strict federal guidelines, it is highly unlikely that any lender would fail to 
properly disclose TALC rates to borrowers.
6 HUD is vague about the type o f housing options that must be discussed with the prospective 
borrower. According to ETCJD’s HECM handbook (for use by HUD personnel, counseling agencies, 
and lenders), the counselor must discuss “[t]he options other than home equity conversion that are 
available to the borrower, including other housing.. .  options.” (HUD (1994), p. 2-3]
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mortgage programs (such as DPLs and PTDs); (c) the financial implications 
associated with HECMs; and (d) the consequences o f  HECMs on tax status, 
eligibility for public benefits, and estate and heirs o f the homeowner.77 Whenever 
feasible, face-to-face counseling must be provided. HUD regulations stipulate that 
“ [t]elephone counseling should not even be mentioned as an alternative to the 
homeowner unless the possibility o f  face-to-face counseling has been completely 
ruled out.”78
COUNSMSA is the number o f HUD-approved housing counselors who 
offered HECM counseling79 in the county’s metropolitan area as o f March 2001, per
1,000 units o f potential demand in the metropolitan area.80 A high value for 
COUNSMSA is interpreted as a relatively high degree o f market development.
This measure o f  market development is imperfect. As mentioned in footnote 
80, not all counties have HECM counselors, and the number o f metropolitan-wide 
counselors is used to calculate COUNSMSA. This means that some homeowners in a 
metropolitan area w ill five in the county where counselors are located, and others will 
not. Those living in the same county as the counselors will likely have better access 
to counseling services. Another shortcoming with COUNSMSA is that it does not 
account for the quality o f the counseling provided, which can vary greatly from one
77 HUD (July 1995).
78 HUD (1994).
79 HECM counseling is one o f several types o f counseling that may be offered by HUD-approved 
housing counseling agencies. These include default/foreclosure counseling, rent delinquency 
counseling, pre-purchase and pre-rental counseling [HUD (July 1995)].
80 Many of the counties analyzed in this study have no HECM counselors. For this reason, the number 
of counselors across the metropolitan area is used.
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housing counseling agency to another.81 Lastly, the number of agencies that are 
approved by HUD to offer HECM counseling may overstate the number that actually 
provide the service.82
The other measure o f HECM market development is LENDERS, the number 
o f financial institutions that have sold (originated) one or more HECMs in a county 
over a ten-year period (1990-2000), per 1,000 units o f potential demand. The period 
1990-2000 captures all mortgagees that have sold HECMs since the inception o f the 
program except for two sold in 1989.83
Any given financial institution can sell one or more HECMs in a county. In 
six o f the 135 counties for which data were obtained, the value of LENDERS is zero; 
by definition, HECM9000 must also be zero in these six cases. These six counties are 
excluded from the regressions reported here, leaving 129 observations.
Individual financial institutions may vary greatly in marketing intensity, 
managerial skill, and customer satisfaction. Moreover, LENDERS almost certainly 
undercounts the number o f institutions that have actually entered the HECM market 
in a county, as those that offer the HECM product but fail to sell any are
81 HUD (2000), and Ken Scholen [personal communication], who has trained many o f  today’s HECM 
counselors.
82 HUD (2000).
83 The HUD data used in this study to calculate LENDERS and HECM9000 show that two HECMs 
were sold to residents of Bernalillo County, New Mexico in 1989, a county that is not among the 
observations o f this study. However, it is well established that the first HECM was closed in 1989 by 
the James B. Nutter Company to a resident o f Fairway, Kansas, which is in Johnson County, one o f the 
counties included in the 129 observations o f this study [HUD (1990, p.1-4) and Scholen (1998, 
p.l 15)]. The ErtJD data erroneously show zero HECMs sold in Johnson County in 1989. The one sold 
in 1989 is almost certainly included in the 1990 data.
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unobservable in the data.84 As with COUNSMSA, LENDERS should be considered a 
crude estimate of market development.
IV . 5 . POSSIBLE ENDOGENEITY OF LENDERS
Ceteris paribus, demand for HECMs will be higher in a county where many
financial institutions have entered the HECM market than in a county where few
have. Not only are prospective borrowers more likely to have heard about HECMs in
counties where the number o f active lenders is relatively high, but also the transaction
costs for obtaining a HECM are probably lower. Transaction costs would include
gathering information about how HECMs work, locating financial institutions that
offer them, visiting a lender, and comparison-shopping.85
Commercial banks, savings and loans, credit unions, and mortgage 
86companies that choose to offer the HECM product are already in place, and simply 
offering a new product to their customers. It is unlikely that lenders evaluated any of 
the independent variables used here when determining whether or not to offer 
HECMs in a county. In addition to wanting to tap into “the potentially large and 
growing” HECM market arising from the impending retirement o f  the baby boom
84 That is, financial institutions that offered the HECMs but failed to sell any do not appear in the data. 
Only lenders that have sold at least one HECM from 1990 through 2000 are included in the data.
85 While interest rates on newly originated HECMs are equal across lenders, origination fees and 
closing costs may vary (within limits set by HUD), at least theoretically. According to Venessa White 
o f BNY Mortgage Co. [personal communication], providing customer service, rather than adjusting 
origination fees and/or closing costs, is the main way that lenders compete for HECM customers. 
Differences in origination fees and closing costs across lenders cannot be accounted for in the data. It 
is assumed that, on average, residents across the counties studied are charged the same origination fees 
and closing costs. Comparison-shopping would include not just comparing origination fees and 
closing costs across different lenders, but in comparing customer service.
86 Seventy-five percent o f HECMs originated in 1999 were by mortgage companies. [HUD (2000)] 
The percent sold by credit unions is very small— data obtained from HUD show that o f the 44,418 
HECMs closed through the end o f 2000, only 28 were originated by credit unions.
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generation, one o f the main reasons lenders decide to offer HECMs is as a hedge 
against demand fluctuations in the conventional forward mortgage market.87 For 
example, if  demand for forward mortgages falls because o f  rising unemployment, 
then HECM business may offset the consequent reduction in a lender’s revenue.
It is assumed that once a financial institution has decided to offer HECMs, its 
supply of HECMs is completely responsive to demand. That is, the institution will 
sell as many HECMs as are demanded by borrowers. Given the very modest numbers 
o f  HECMs sold thus far in the U.S., it is extremely doubtful that lenders are 
concerned with putting a cap on the number of HECMs they will originate due to 
investment portfolio considerations. Indeed, some lenders are dropping out of the 
HECM program because o f  low activity.88
In other words, LENDERS is considered exogenous in the OLS regression. 
However, to account for the possibility that it is endogenous, a TSLS regression is 
also performed, with LENDERS as the instrumented variable.
IV. 6. Instruments in TSLS
In the TSLS regression, BANKS—the number o f  commercial and savings 
banks in the county (1995 data) per 1,000 units o f potential demand— is used as an 
instrument for LENDERS*9 It is reasonable to suppose that LENDERS is more likely
87 HUD (2000), p.33.
88 In 1998 and 1999, for the first time since the initiation of the program, more financial institutions left 
the HECM market than entered it. The decision to leave has been based mainly on a perceived lack of 
demand [HUD (2000)]. At least one lender was active in at least one year from 1990-2000 in every 
county evaluated in the regressions o f this study.
89 The essence of the TSLS technique is that each potentially endogenous right-hand side variable (in 
this case, only one—LENDERS) is replaced by a proxy that is assumed to be uncorrelated with the
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to be high when BANKS is high. The simple correlation between the two variables is 
0.47 (Table 7).
Table 7 suggests that two other variables— INCOME  and MARRYKID—may 
be good instruments for LENDERS (simple correlations with LENDERS of 0.40 and 
0.65, respectively). INCOME is the median income o f the county, and MARRYKID is 
the percent o f  all households composed of married couples residing with their 
children.
It is not unlikely that financial institutions evaluate income and household 
composition when making marketing decisions. High-income areas are likely to 
generate greater business activity for financial institutions on both the liability side 
(deposits) and asset side (loans) of their balance sheets, and so are attractive to these 
institutions. Indeed, the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) was passed to ensure 
that depository institutions were meeting the credit needs o f the low- and moderate- 
income households located in their communities.90 Such protections were not needed 
for high-income households. INCOME is used as an instrument for LENDERS with 
the assumption that financial institutions will be drawn to high-income areas.91
As mentioned above (footnote 86), mortgage companies have closed about 
three out o f every four HECMs sold to date. Either commercial banks or savings and 
loans have sold all but a trivial number o f the other 25% o f HECMs. The main
disturbance. The proxy is an estimate o f the original variable determined by regressing the original on 
all exogenous variables, including the instruments. [Greene (1997), Ch. 16.]
90 U.S. Code, Title 12, §2901.
91 The CRA does not prevent a depository institution from choosing where to locate; rather, it requires 
the institution to meet the credit needs o f the entire community (including low- and moderate-income 
neighborhoods) in which they do locate.
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business o f savings and loans is making conventional home loans. Thus, the vast 
majority o f  HECM originators specialize in the residential mortgage market.
Areas where a high percent o f households are composed o f married couples 
with children are probably attractive marketing areas for such financial institutions. 
Demand in these areas for the non-reverse-mortgage products they sell—home 
purchase loans, refinancing o f home loans, and home equity lines o f credit—may be 
relatively high. For example, in 1999, nearly 30% of all homeowners were in this 
demographic group.92 For these reasons, MARRYKID is used as another instrument 
for LENDERS. There are three instruments for LENDERS, then: BANKS, INCOME, 
and MARRYKID.
92 U.S. Census Bureau (2001).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
38
V. FINDINGS
V I.A . OLS— LENDERS INCLUDED
Table 8 shows all o f  the regression results: OLS with and without the possibly 
endogenous variable LENDERS, and TSLS. The OLS regression including 
LENDERS is reported first, and then the consequences o f  excluding the variable are 
reviewed, followed by a  discussion o f the TSLS findings.
The adjusted R-square (0.235) o f the OLS regression including LENDERS 
indicates that the overall explanatory power o f the model is modest, but this is a 
respectable figure for a cross-sectional, small sample-size analysis. All o f the 
variables have the correct signs except for COUNSMSA (-3.485) and RELIGION 
(0.054). Neither o f these is statistically significant. The measurement problems of 
COUNSMSA that were discussed in Chapter IV.4 may explain the poor performance 
o f that variable in the regression.
The other measure of market development, LENDERS, is positive and highly 
significant. Each additional HECM lender that becomes active in an area is predicted 
to lead to an increase o f  HECMs demanded o f about 2.3, which represents about 20% 
o f the mean o f the dependent variable HECM9000 (11.44).
WHITE is positive (0.141), as expected, and significant at the five percent 
level.93 The regression results also support the hypothesis that education has a 
positive influence on HECM demand—ED is positive (0.346) and significant at the 
one percent level. The percent o f persons bom in the same state as their current
93 Hereinafter, all analyses o f  statistical significance refer to one-tailed tests.
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residence is also found to influence demand. As expected, BORN_IN is negative (-
0.127), although it meets a lower threshold o f  statistical significance (10%).
Fairly strong evidence is found supporting the theory that a weak attachment 
to their community by the old (OLDjOUT  is high) will result in a relatively low 
demand for reverse mortgages. The coefficient on OLDJDUT equals -1.29. When 
the percent o f  old persons that out-migrate increases by one (or by about 16% of 
O LD jO U T’s  mean o f 6.1), then the number o f HECMs sold in an area is estimated to 
decline by 1.29— or by about 11% o f the mean o f HECM9000. OLDJDUT is 
significant at the one percent level.
Weak family and community ties among the young are found to increase 
demand for reverse mortgages. YJDUT is highly significant (1% level) and positive 
(0.767). A one-unit increase in YJDUT—seven percent o f its mean (14.86)— is 
predicted to increase demand for HECMs by 0.767— approximately seven percent. 
Approximating at the means, the elasticity o f demand with respect to young out­
migration is equal to one. The elasticity o f demand with respect to old out-migration 
is higher at about 1.5.
The OLS results provide rather strong support for the theory that an area’s 
family and community ties influence demand for reverse mortgages. This implies 
that a bequest motive among old homeowners has an effect on their decisions 
regarding whether or not to take out these loans.
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V.l.B. OLS— LENDERS EXCLUDED
As discussed in Chapter IV.5, LENDERS is possibly endogenous. A more 
rigorous accounting o f  this possibility is given in Chapter V.2, where TSLS results 
are presented. It is interesting, though to compare the results from excluding 
LENDERS from the OLS estimation from those described above, where LENDERS 
was included.
The only noteworthy change is that COUNSMSA is negative (-3.485) in the 
previous regression and positive (1.834) in the regression excluding LENDERS. The 
values o f the remaining coefficients are similar to those in the previous regression, 
although the levels o f significance are slightly different in a few cases. For example, 
both YJDUT and OLDJDUT are significant at the five percent level, as opposed to 
one percent previously. The overall explanatory power does not change when 
LENDERS is excluded (adjusted R-square equals .235).
Little harm, then, results from excluding the possibly endogenous LENDERS. 
I f  no suitable instruments for the variable could be found in order to perform a TSLS, 
then it could be dropped from the analysis altogether without changing the picture 
that emerges from the regressions: family and community ties o f an area do indeed 
influence demand for reverse mortgages.
V.l.C. P o s s ib l e  h e t e r o s c e d a s t ic it y  in  OLS
The error terms in the OLS regression may be heteroscedastic. If  this were 
true, then OLS might not be the appropriate econometric specification for this study, 
and an alternative specification such as a weighted least squares or a log-linear form
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might be preferred. Although, in the presence o f heteroscedasticity, the OLS 
estimators are unbiased, the estimated variances are biased, invalidating tests of 
significance.94
The possibility o f heteroscedasticity in the OLS regressions reported here may 
be illustrated as follows. Consider a model in which the dependent variable is 
continuous. Let yjj be the value o f this variable for the ith person in the j th county. At 
the individual level, the model is:
yii = a  + Px,j + Ufj, [Equation 1 ]
where Xy is the independent variable or a vector o f these variables, and Uy is the 
disturbance term with a mean of zero. Assume homoscedasticity at the individual 
level:
Now average Equation 1 over the nj old homeowners composing potential demand in 
the j th county to get
yj = a  + Pxj + uj,
where y Xj ,  and Uj are means. In this paper, y, = HECM9000. I f  nj varies among 
counties, the error term may be heteroscedastic:
94 Maddala (1992), Ch.5.
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That is, the disturbance may be inversely related to the size of potential demand in the 
county.95
White’s general test o f heteroscedasticity was used to+ determine whether or 
not it is likely that the OLS disturbances are biased in this manner.96 To conduct the 
test, the OLS residuals were squared and then regressed on a constant, the inverse o f 
potential demand, and the squared inverse o f potential demand. The number o f 
observations was multiplied the resulting R-square to obtain the test statistic, which is 
asymptotically distributed as j?[2] (the degrees o f  freedom equals the number o f 
regressors, excluding the constant).
In this instance, the ^ [2 ] statistic equals 0.8643, far below the critical value of 
9.22 at the one percent significance level; therefore, the null hypothesis that OLS is 
homoscedastic is not rejected. The significance tests on the OLS coefficients that 
were discussed in the preceding section therefore are valid.
V.2. T w o -s t a g e  l e a s t  s q u a r e s
As discussed in Chapter IV.5, BANKS, MARRYKID, and INCOME are used as 
instruments for the possibly endogenous LENDERS in the TSLS regression. An F- 
test o f their joint significance reveals that, as a group, these are strong instruments for 
LENDERS (F-ratio equals 23.04).97
9S One possible solution to this specific form o f heteroscedasticity—if indeed it exists—would 
be to compute a weighted least squares regression using the square root o f nj as weights. [Johnston and 
Dinardo (1997), pp.171-172.]
96 White (1980).
97 In the first stage of the TSLS, MARRYKID (coefficient o f .1133) and BANKS (coefficient o f .0568) 
are significant at the one percent level (two-tailed). INCOME (coefficient o f .00002) is insignificant.
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The results o f the TSLS regression are strikingly similar to the OLS results— 
all o f  the coefficients are nearly identical, as are their levels o f significance. The only 
difference—a relatively minor one— is that the coefficient on LENDERS is about 10 
percent lower in the TSLS regression, and its level o f significance is five percent 
instead o f one percent.
Thus, the TSLS regression adds virtually nothing to the story already told by 
OLS. This, along with the findings discussed in Chapter V .l.B  regarding the OLS 
regression excluding LENDERS, suggests that LENDERS is not endogenous. A 
Hausman x2-test o f  the consistency o f OLS provides further confirmation that the 
OLS specification reported in Chapter V.1.A is suitable for the purposes of this 
study. The findings in that chapter that family and community ties influence 
demand for reverse mortgages are sound.
98 The test is sometimes interpreted as testing the endogeneity of a particular variable, but technically 
this is incorrect. The null hypothesis o f the test, which is performed under the assumption that the 
OLS estimates are efficient and that the TSLS estimates are inefficient and consistent, is that the 
differences in the coefficients from the OLS and TSLS regressions are not systematic. [Johnston and 
Dinardo (1997), p.339.]
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VI. CONCLUSION
Reverse mortgages are loans against home equity that do not have to be repaid 
until the borrower moves, sells the home, or dies. This paper explores whether an 
area’s family and community ties influence demand for one type of reverse 
mortgage—the HECM—but the implications extend to other types of reverse 
mortgages. Although several previous studies obtained estimates o f the potential 
demand for reverse mortgages, this is the first study, to my knowledge, o f  how actual 
demand may be determined, and o f how it may be related to potential demand.
The evidence concerning the impact o f market development is mixed: 
although the number o f  active HECM lenders (adjusted for potential demand in the 
area) is found to have a significantly positive effect upon demand, the number o f 
HECM counselors is found not to have a significant effect, and is negative in the two 
regressions that include the lenders variable. This could be due to the measurement 
imperfections o f the variable noted in Chapter IV.5.
Race is found to influence demand—the higher the percent o f the population 
that is white, the greater demand. The overall educational achievement o f an area has 
a significant, positive influence on demand, suggesting that more financially 
sophisticated individuals are likelier to be receptive to the complicated reverse 
mortgage loan.
Fairly strong evidence is found that family and community ties do influence 
demand for reverse mortgages. One exception among the variables relating to family 
or community ties is the variable on religious adherence. Degree o f religious 
adherence is not found to be significant; indeed, the coefficient on that variable has
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the wrong sign (positive) in all three regressions. Perhaps religious organizations—as 
is true o f the Mormons in Utah—are involved in educating their older members about 
reverse mortgages. If  so, then this would have a positive influence on demand that 
would confound the negative influence o f  the family ties that the variable is intended 
to reflect.
The other variables on family or community ties provide more convincing
results.
The variable YJDUT is significantly positive in all o f the regressions, 
suggesting that weak family and community ties among the young have a positive 
influence on demand. OLDJDUT is significantly negative across the regressions: 
when the old’s ties to their communities are weak, demand for reverse mortgages will 
be low. Demand is predicted to fall when the percent of persons that were bom in the 
same state as their current residence rises.
A much more ambitious research project would involve estimating potential 
demand for many counties throughout the United States. Unless only metropolitan 
area counties are analyzed, such a project would also entail redefining out-migration, 
which in this paper has been defined as moving from a county and out o f that 
county’s metropolitan area. Also, calculating out-migration figures is quite 
cumbersome and time-consuming, as the data are not machine-readable, and must be 
cut and pasted from “user-friendly” tables available on CD-ROMs prepared by the 
Census. Perhaps new out-migration data that will be available from the 2000 census 
will be easier to manipulate.
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The results o f this study suggest that a bequest motive for holding home 
equity exists in some households. Financial institutions choosing to offer HECMs 
therefore should be sensitive to the family ties in their marketing areas, both when 
implementing outreach and informational programs designed for their constituents, 
and when assessing the viability o f  offering the HECM product.
The 50 initial lenders—each authorized to originate up to 50 HECMs— in the 
HECM-demonstration were selected by lottery. Selection was based upon ten HUD 
regions, and the proportion of the nation’s total older homeowners that resided in 
these regions. According to HUD (1990), “the Department [HUD] could have 
selected demonstration areas, defined by community or [s]tate.. . [but did not] on the 
ground that the Department should not prejudge which communities. . .  were suitable 
participants.”99 While this strategy for initiating the demonstration may be 
understandable, the results of this study suggest that targeting areas of weak family 
ties, and areas where the old are unlikely to migrate out o f the community, might 
have improved the success of the program.
99 op. cit., p.4-13.
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Appendix A. Explanation o f Regression Variables.
The unit o f analysis is a county. All counties analyzed are in one of 26 
selected metropolitan areas in the United States. The expected signs o f the regression 
coefficients are in parentheses following the variable names.
• Dependent variable:
HECM9000
The number o f Home Equity Conversion Mortgages (HECMs) endorsed 
1990-2000 by the Federal Housing Administration for borrowers residing in 
the county, divided by potential demand for reverse mortgages in the county 
in 1989, times 1,000.
Potential demand equals the number o f homeowners aged 70 and over who 
have $30,000 or more in home equity. Rasmussen, Megbolugbe, and Morgan 
(1995) estimated potential demand for selected (P)MSAs. The county-level 
figures used in this paper are weighted averages o f Rasmussen, Megbolugbe, 
and M organ’s (P)MSA figures. The weights are based on the percent of a 
(P)MSA’s homeowners aged 75 and over that reside in each county (1990 
data). Data on homeowners aged 70 and over were not available, so those 
aged 75 and over were used instead.
• Independent variables relating: to both family and community ties:
YjO UT (+)
The percent o f residents aged 25-39 in 1985 who moved to a county outside o f 
the metropolitan area by 1990.
O L D O U T (-)
The percent o f residents aged 60-79 in 1985 who moved to a county outside o f 
the metropolitan area by 1990.
• Independent variables relating to family ties:
RELIGION (-)
The percent o f residents who belong to a religious denomination (1990 data). 
B O R N IN  (-)
The percent o f the population who were bom in the county’s state (1990 data).
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•  Other independent variables that influence demand for HECMs:
WHITE (+)
The percent o f the population who are white (1996 data).
ED (+)
The percent o f  residents aged 25 and over who have graduated from college 
(1990 data).
• Measures o f  the degree to which the HECM market is developed.:
LENDERS (+)
The number o f  lenders who sold HECMs in the county 1990-2000, divided by 
potential demand for reverse mortgages in the county in 1989, times 1,000.
COUNSMSA (+)
The number o f HUD-approved HECM counselors in the county’s 
metropolitan area as o f March 2001, divided by the metropolitan area’s 
potential demand for reverse mortgages in 1989, times 1,000.
•  The following variables are used as instruments for LENDERS in TSLS regressions: 
BANKS
The number o f  (FDIC-insured) commercial and savings bank offices in the 
county as o f June 1995 divided by potential demand for reverse mortgages in 
the county in 1989, times 1,000.
MARRYKID
The percent o f total households composed o f married couples living with their 
children (1990 data).
INCOME
Median household money income (1993 data).
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Table 1. Availability of d ifferent Types of Reverse Mortgages.
Type o f  reverse morteaee Availability
Multipurpose, private sector loans:
HUD’s FHA-insured HECM* All 50 states and D.C.
Fannie Mae's Home Keeper* All 50 states and D.C.
Current availability: AZ, CA, CO,
CT, FL, GA, IL, MD, MI, NV, NJ,
OR, PA, UT, VA, WA, WY, and
Financial Freedom Senior Funding Corporation's Washington, D.C. Availability
(FFSFC's) Cash Account Plan* expected to extend to the following
states by April 2001: HI, IN, KY,
MA, MN, NM, NC, OH, TX, VT,
WI.
Special purpose, public sector loans:
Deferred payment loans**
Generally offered by local 
nonprofit or government agencies 
on housing or community 
development
Available in all or parts o f CA,
CO, FL, GA, IL, IA, ME, MD,
Property tax deferrals** MA, MI, NH, ND, OR, SD, TN,
TX, UT, VA, WA, WI, WY, and
D.C.
* Availability as of February 2001.
** Availability as o f  October 1996.
Source: Scholen (1997) for public-se*ctor loans; Tom Scabareti, Marketing Vice President 
at FFSFC, for data on their Cash A ccount Plan (private communication); National Reverse 
Mortgage Lenders Association's "Lenders List," accessed at
http://www.reversemortgage.org/Lemders%20Lists/lendersl.htm in February 2001, for data 
on the HECM and Home Keeper.
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Figure 1. Out-Migration Matrix
County A: 
OLD, YOUNG
County B: 
OLD, young
County C: 
old, YOUNG
County D: 
old, young
Explanation: "YOUNG" means that a low percent o f young 
people move out o f the county's metropolitan area; "young" 
means that the percent is high. Similar definitions apply to 
"OLD" and "old."
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Table 2. Itemized Costs on a HECM Loan
1. Origination Fee: The maximum allowable is the greater o f  $2,000 or 2% of the 
“maximum claim amount,” which is the lesser o f the home’s value or FHA 203(b) 
limit for the area. Can vary from lender to lender. May be financed by the loan.
2. Closing Costs: These include fees for services such as an appraisal, title searcli 
and insurance, surveys, inspections, recording fees, mortgage taxes, etc. Generally 
range from $1,000 to $1,800, but can be over $3,000 in some states, especially for 
higher-valued homes. Lenders within the same state generally charge the same fees, 
but there can be wide interstate differences. May be financed by the loan.
3. Mortgage Insurance: Charge in two parts: (1) an up-front premium of 2% of the 
maximum claim amount, and (2) a monthly premium o f 1/12 of 0.5% of the 
outstanding principal balance. May be financed with the loan. The insurance 
premiums are collected by FHA, which protects borrowers from lender default, and 
lenders from “cross-over risk.” May be financed by the loan.
4. Servicing Fee: Generally range from $20 to $30 per month for servicing the 
loan, which includes making loan advances, transferring insurance premiums to 
FHA, monitoring compliance o f  the loan agreement (such as maintaining the home 
and paying property taxes), and sending account statements. Fee is added to loan 
balance each month.
5. Interest Rates: Today, all lenders charge the same interest on HECM loans: the 
1-year Treasury security index plus a lender’s margin. The lender’s margin is set by 
Fannie Mae, which purchases virtually all HECMs (in the secondary market.) In 
March 2001, the lender’s margin was 1.20 percentage points for monthly adjustable 
loans, and 2.10 points for annually adjusted loans. While the interest rate applied to 
the outstanding balance changes periodically with changes in the T-bill rate over the 
life o f the loan, the payments to the borrower do not change. A fixed rate HECM is 
also available, but very few have been originated because Fannie Mae will not 
purchase fixed rate HECMs.
Source: Scholen (1997) except for interest rates, for which Roger Reynolds o f Wells Fargo and Ken 
Scholen of the National Center for Home Equity Conversion provided information in private 
communications.
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Table 3. Average Number of Years of Life Remaining, Selected 
Ages, Sex and Race, U.S., 1998.
Life ex pectancy (in years)
Age Total Females Males- Whites Blacks
65 17.8 19.2 16.0 17.8 16.1
70 14.3 15.5 12.8 14.4 13.0
75 11.3 12.2 10.0 11.3 10.5
80 8.6 9.2 7.5 8.5 8.2
Source: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (2001).
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Table 4. Characteristics of HECM Borrowers and AH Older Homeowners
Household characteristics
HECM 
borrowers (1995 
HUD analysis)*
HECM borrowers 
(1999 HUD 
analysis)*
All older 
homeowners**
Median age (in years) 76 75 74
Median annual income*** 510,368 NA 518,607
Sex/household composition:
Female living alone 59.5% 56.3% 29.6%
Male living alone 12.4% 13.9% 8.3%
Living with others 28.1% 29.8% 62.1%
Race/Ethnicity:
Non-Hispanic White 92.7% 86.4% 87.2%
Non-Hispanic Black 5.9% 9.2% 7.8%
Hispanic 0.8% 3.1% 3.7%
Other 0.6% 1.3% 1.3%
Note: NA = Not Available.
’•‘Minimum age o f  a HECM borrower is 62 years. Data are from HECM application materials as o f the date of 
application.
**For householders aged 65 and over. Figures are for 1997 [U.S. Census Bureau (1999)], except for median 
income, which is for 1995 [U.S. Census Bureau (1997)].
***HUD (2000) warns that the data on the median income o f HECM borrowers may not be reliable; hence, the 
figure here (taken from HUD (1995)) should be viewed with caution. (A later analysis o f  the data revealed many 
cases where values were zero or missing.)
Source: For HECM data, HUD (1995) and (2000); for all homeowners, U.S. Census Bureau (1997) and (1999), 
except for race/ethnicity [HUD (2000)].
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State/County FIPS 
Code (1990 
definitions)
Metropolitan area and 
component counties
State/County FIPS 
Code (1990 
definitions)
Metropolitan area and 
component counties
Birmingham, AL New York, NY
01009 Blount 36005 Bronx
01073 Jefferson 36047 Kings
01115 St. Clair 36061 New York
01117 Shelby 36079 Putnam
01127 Walker 36081 Queens
Chicago, IL 36085 Richmond
17031 Cook 36087 Rockland
17043 Du Page 36119 Westchester
17111 McHenry Newark, NJ
Cleveland, OH 34013 Essex
39035 Cuyahoga 34027 Morris
39055 Geauga 34037 Sussex
39085 Lake 34039 Union
39103 Medina Oklahoma City, OK
Denver, CO 40017 Canadian
08001 Adams 40027 Cleveland
08005 Arapahoe 40083 L.ogan
08031 Denver 40087 McClain
08035 Douglas 40109 Oklahoma
08059 .'efferson 40125 3ottawatomie
Indianapolis, IN Philadelphia, PA-NJ
18011 3oone 34005 3urlington, NJ
18057 Jamilton 34007 Camden, NJ
18059 Jancock 34015 Gloucester, NJ
18063 Jendricks 42017 Bucks, PA
18081 ohnson 42029 Chester, PA
18097 Vlarion 42045 Delaware, PA
18109 Morgan 42091 Montgomery, PA
18145 Shelby 42101 Philadelphia, PA
(continued on next page)
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(Table 5 continued from previous page.)
State/County FIPS 
Code(1990 
definitions)
Metropolitan area and 
component counties
State/County FIPS 
Code (1990 
definitions)
Metropolitan area and 
component counties
K.C., MO-KS Pittsburg, PA
20091 Johnson, KS 42003 Ailegheny, PA
20103 Leavenworth, KS 42051 Fayette, PA
20121 Miami, KS 42125 Washington, PA
20209 Wyandotte, KS 42129 Westmoreland, PA
29037 Cass, MO Portland, OR
29047 Clay, MO 41005 Clackamas, OR
29095 Jackson, MO 41051 Multnomah, OR
29107 Lafayette, MO 41067 Washington, OR
29165 Platte, MO 41071 Yamhill, OR
29177 Ray, MO Rochester, N Y
L.AJOrange Co., CA 36051 Livingston, NY
06037 Los Angeles 36055 Monroe, NY
06059 Orange 36069 Ontario, NY
Memphis, TN-AR-MS 36073 Orleans, NY
05035 Crittenden, AR 36117 Wayne, NY
28033 De Soto, MS Salt Lake City, UT
47157 Shelby, TN 49011 Davis, UT
47167 Tipton, TN 49035 Salt Lake, UT
Minneapolis, MN-WI 49057 Weber, UT
27003 Anoka Seattle, WA
27019 Carver 53033 ■Cing, WA
27025 Chisago 53061 Snohomish, WA
27037 Dakota Tampa, FL
27053 Tennepin 12053 Jemando, FL
27059 'santi 12057 Hillsborough, FL
27123 Ramsey 12101 Pasco, FL
27139 Scott 12103 r’inellas, FL
27163 Washington Buffalo, N Y
27171 Wright 36029 Erie, NY
55109 St. Croix, WT
(continued on next page)
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(Table 5 continued from previous page.)
State/County FIPS 
C ode(1990 
definitions)
Metropolitan area and 
component counties
State/County FIPS 
Code (1990 
definitions)
Metropolitan area and 
component counties
New Orleans, LA Atlanta, GA
22051 Jefferson Parish 13013 Barrow County
22071 Orleans Parish 13035 Butts County
22087 St. Bernard Parish 13057 Cherokee County
22089 St. Charles Parish 13063 Clayton County
22095 St. John the Baptist Parish 13067 Cobb County
22103 St. Tammany Parish 13077 Coweta County
Miami, FL 13089 DeKalb County
12025 Dade, FL 13097 Douglas County
Phoenix, AZ 13113 Fayette County
04013 Maricopa, AZ 13117 Forsyth County
San Diego, CA 13121 Fulton County
06073 San Diego, CA 13125 Gwinnett County
San Francisco, CA 13151 Henry County
06041 Vlarin, CA 13217 Newton County
06075 San Francisco, CA 13223 Paulding County
06081 San Mateo, CA 13247 Rockdale County
Milwaukee, WI 13255 Spalding County
55079 Vlilwaukee, WI 13297 Walton County
55089 Ozaukee, WI
55131 Washington, WI
55133 Waukesha, WI
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Table 6. Summary Statistics.
Variable Mean Standard deviation Minimum Maximum
HECM9000 11.44 12.25 0.37 65.11
YOUT 14.86 5.54 5.47 31.38
OLDJDUT 6.10 2.42 1.82 14.61
RELIGION 54.92 13.73 25.90 84.50
BORN IN 64.27 16.50 18.70 90.02
MARRYKID 29.92 7.10 9.79 47.12
WHITE 85.50 14.21 33.90 99.50
INCOME 38,115 8,924 20,710 63,560
ED 20.94 8.52 6.70 44.00
LENDERS 1.93 1.67 0.15 10.03
COUNSMSA 0.16 0.18 0.02 0.77
BANKS 13.54 7.07 3.79 43.22
n = 129
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Table 7. Simple Correlation Matrix.
YJDUT OLDJDUT RELIGION B O R N JN MARRYKID WHITE INCOME ED LENDERS COUNSMSA BANKS
YJDUT 1
OLDJDUT 0.5126 1
RELIGION -0.0922 -0.1836 1
B O R N JN -0.5027 -0.4485 0.4809 1
MARRYKID -0.2893 -0.01 -0.0179 0.3498 1
WHITE -0.2758 0.0645 -0.2581 0.1716 0.5994 1
INCOME 0.0517 0,501 -0.1421 -0.028 0.5787 0.4817 1
ED 0.5082 0.507 -0.0773 -0.3746 -0.1758 -0.0516 0.5909
LENDERS -0.1201 -0.0036 -0.0616 0.1844 0.6535 0.3346 0.4021 m m
COUNSMSA 0.3775 -0.1477 0.2027 0.1287 0.0533 -0.2351 -0.236 -0.1162 0,1006
BANKS -0.0037 0.0251 -0.0164 -0.0507 0.4613 0.1373 0.4939 0.2853 0,4698 0.0675 1
Ln
03
Table 8. Ordinary Least Squares, with and without LENDERS, 
and Two-Stage Least Squares.1
Variable
OLS with 
LENDERS
OLS without 
LENDERS TSLS2
YJDUT 0.767**
(0.296)
0.666’
(0.310)
0.756 ** 
(0.299)
OLDJDUT -1.290**
(0.534)
-1.106*
(0.558)
-1.271 ** 
(0.539)
RELIGION 0.054
(0.087)
0.030
(0.091)
0.051
(0.088)
B O R N JN -0.127*
(0.086)
-0.097
(0.090)
-0.124 * 
(0.087)
WHITE 0.141 * 
(0.081)
0.221 ** 
(0.082)
0.149**
(0.086)
ED 0.346 ** 
(0.144)
0.359**
(0.151)
0.348 ** 
(0.144)
COUNSMSA -3.485
(7.225)
1.834
(7.426)
-2.909
(7.478)
LENDERS 2.265 ** 
(0.622)
— 2.020 * 
(1.024)
constant -9.961
(10.062)
-13.809
(10.501)
-10.377
(10.162)
Number o f  obs. 
Adj R-squared 
Root MSE
129
0.235
10.718
129
0.235
10.718
129
0.234
10.725
Hausman x f-test o f  the 
consistency o f  OLS
— — 0.09
F-ratio from  a test o f  the jo int 
significance o f  the instrumental 
variables F [3, 118]
— — 23.04
* Significant at 10% (one-tailed test).
* Significant at 5% (one-tailed test).
Significant at 1% (one-tailed test).
1 Coefficients are reported (standard errors in parentheses).
2 Instrumented: LENDERS. Instruments: BANKS, MARRYKID, INCOME.
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Data Sources 
•Potential demand fo r  selected metropolitan areas:
Rasmussen, David W., Isaac F. Megbolugbe, a n d  Barbara A. Morgan, “The Potential 
Demand for Reverse Mortgage Products,” Fannie Mae Office o f Housing Research, 
Internal Research Report, April 1995.
•Number o f FHA-insared HECMs by county, lencder, and year:
Data were obtained from HUD.
•Number o f  HUD-approved housing counseling agencies that provide HECM  
counseling:
Data by state and zip code were obtained from  HUD’s “Housing Counseling 
Clearinghouse” website, http://www.hudhcc.org/agencies/hcamap.html. Counts o f 
HECM counselors by county (and thus by metropolitan area) were derived by using 
Insight Software Solution’s Zip Express 2000 software to match county names to zip 
codes.
•County-level out-migration, by age, 1985-1990:
U.S. Census Bureau, County-to-County Migration Flow Files, 1990 Census o f  
Population and Housing, Special Project 312 (SP-312), Out-Migration, CD-ROM.
•  Other county-level variables:
U.S. Census Bureau, USA Counties, 1998, CD-ROM.
U.S. Census Bureau, 1990 Summary Tape File I  A, {C90STF1 A), accessed on the 
Internet at http ://venus.census, gov/cdrom/1 ookup/.
Bradley, Martin B., Norman M. Green, Jr., Dale E . Jones, Mac Lynn, Lou McNeil 
(1992). Churches and Church Membership in the United States, 1990: An 
Enumeration by Region, State and County Based on Data Reported fo r  133 
Church Groupings. Atlanta, Georgia: Glenmary Research Institute.
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